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DO MISSING INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS BLOCK 
ENLARGEMENT OF WATER MARKETS? 
 
by  
K. William Easter* and Rodney Smith** 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As should be expected there has been a growth in water markets as water has become 
increasingly scarce in many parts of the world (Easter et al., 1998).  Yet the increase has been 
confined to trading internal to the local water districts with a few exceptions, such as California's 
Water Bank during the 1990s droughts.  Only limited trade has occurred among water districts or 
river basins.  Several hypotheses have been suggested concerning why this has been the case. 
One is that the necessary infrastructure is not in place to move water between districts and 
watersheds and it is expensive to construct the canals.  A second possibility is the strong belief, 
that water is a basic local resource and important for local development.  A third reason may be 
the concern that water transfers to users outside of the local area (region) or to other types of use 
will cause adverse environmental impacts and hurt downstream water users.  These concerns 
about third party impacts may act as catalysts to simulate development of institutional 
arrangements which effectively block trades to outside regions. 
Constraints to market expansion can also be explained in terms of potential market 
failures that involve technological and pecuniary externalities as well as the public goods 
characteristics of infrastructure including irrigation canal maintenance and the provision of joint 
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water-services (table 1).  The pecuniary source of externalities involves the decrease in local 
business caused by a number of farmers decreasing irrigation and reducing agricultural 
production through land fallowing or even land retirement.  These farmers can earn higher rates  
 
Table 1.   Types of Market Failure 
A. Pecuniary  Externality 
  1.  Reduction in land cultivated that causes drop in local economy 
B. Technological  Externality 
  1.  Higher pumping cost 
  2.  Reduced return flows 
  3.  Reduced stream flows and dried up wetlands 
C.  Public Good Issues 
  1.  Drop in joint provision of water services 
  2.  Higher farmer cost of maintaining infrastructure 
 
of return by selling water to urban users or to irrigators outsides the local district.  The resulting 
drop in production can cause a decrease in local demand for inputs and processing services, 
which reduces demand for local businesses (table 2).  There may also be a decline in demand for 
labor by agriculture, local businesses and possibly the irrigation agency.  Offsetting the drop in 
local sales could be the increased income farmers gain from the water sales.  The increased 
income could expand local sales of goods and services especially new irrigation (water saving) 
technology.  If this happens it is possible that the income effect will offset the negative impact on 
local service demands of the fallowed or retired land. 
The technological externalities disturb a different set of stakeholders than do pecuniary 
externalities and will vary depending on the source of water being traded.  For groundwater, the 
externality involves well interference and higher pumping costs due to declining watertables 
caused by increased pumping which is exacerbated by those expanding their water sales.  This 
problem can exist with just local trading but expanding the market to include urban users and 
outside areas mean a greater water demand and increased pumping by water sellers who impose 
higher pumping costs on neighboring pumpers (table 3).  If recharge is high, cost increases may   3 
 
 
Table 2.  Potential Market Failure:  Pecuniary Externality 
 
A.  Activity Causing Externality 
  1.  Land fallowing  
B. Negative  Impacts 
  1.  Drop in local business 
  2.  Drop in local employment 
C.  Principal Stakeholders Damaged 
 1.  Local  businesses 
 2.  Irrigation  agency 
 
 
be small and only temporary, such as in Bangladesh, but in other cases the watertable will 
recover slowly, if at all, and the pumping cost will increase for all irrigators in the area overtime. 
A different type of technical externality arises because of changes in return flows when 
water is traded between areas or uses.  This is primarily a problem with surface water irrigation, 
but it can be a problem with groundwater.  In many surface water irrigation systems as much as 
50% or more of the water delivered to a farmer will become return flow and be used by farmers 
downstream--which is why many irrigation specialists have argued that one needs to look at 
basin water use efficiency and not worry as much about farm level water use efficiency.  If all 
the water or a significant amount of the water in a district is traded to another district, or type of 
use, those farmers dependent on the return flow will receive little or no water (table 3).  
Offsetting this loss (externality), somewhat, is the fact that the water buyers may well provide 
return flows to a new set of downstream users so that the net loss to society as a whole may be 
quite small or nonexistent.  Still it is the local users that are adversely affected by any one of 
these several externalities who will be catalysts for establishing institutions to block any water 
trades which may reduce return flows, raise pumping costs, or reduce local business activity. 
The final class of technological externalities is one that results from environmental 
damages caused by changes in water use.  We will characterize this as damage to in-stream water 
services such as wildlife and fish habitat (table 3).  Here again water trading outside the local   4 
 
area may only increase the damages that already exist due to local use of water for irrigation.  
However, the attempt to expand water markets can act as a catalyst to organize environmental 
groups to try to stop further water trading. 
The public good characteristics of infrastructure and the joint provision of services are 
primarily of concern to individuals in the district who are using water services.  The irrigators 
who do not want to sell water are concerned that they may have to pay a larger part of the canal  
 
Table 3.  Potential Market Failure:  Technological Externality 
 
A.  Event Causing Externality 
  1.  Drop in groundwater table 
  2.  Reduced return flows 
  3.  Reduced stream flows and loss of wetlands 
B. Negative  Impacts 
  1.  Increase in pumping costs 
  2.  Drop in downstream irrigation 
  3.  Drop in environmental services and nonirrigation water services 
C.  Principal Stakeholders Damaged 
  1.  Irrigators not selling water and rural domestic water users 
  2.  Downstream irrigators not selling water 
  3.  Nonirrigation water users and environmental groups 
 
maintenance costs (table 4).  If most of the farmers served by one canal sell their water, the few 
remaining farmers may have difficulty maintaining the canal and not receive adequate water 
flows due to overall reduced water deliveries. 
The joint provision of water services is important for those families and individuals who 
make use of the water before it reaches the farmers fields.  In developing countries this means a 
long list of uses including: bathing, livestock water, fishing, recreation, and local business and 
domestic water uses.  Meinzen-Dick and Bakker (2000) point out how many of these different 
uses would be affected if water was transferred from irrigation to urban uses in the Kirindi Oya 
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Table 4.  Potential Market Failure:  Public Good Characteristics 
 
A.  Type of Activity 
  1.  Joint provision of water services 
  2.  Maintaining canal infrastructure 
B. Negative  Impact 
  1.  Drop in services to nonirrigation water uses (fishing, livestock, bathing, etc.) 
  2.  Increased costs to remaining irrigators 
C.  Principal Stakeholders Damaged 
  1.  Nonirrigation water users 
  2.  Irrigators not selling water 
 
irrigation system in Sri Lanka (Figure 1).  They go on to suggest that most of the nonirrigation 
water users have very weak or nonexistent water rights except for domestic water uses and 
possibly fishing.  Even in developed countries, livestock water, recreation and fishing are likely 
to be important water uses but their water rights are likely to be uncertain.  
These nonirrigation water users would be adversely affected primarily when a significant 
share of the water was sold to another district or for different type of use (table 4).  Thus the 
impacts of water sales on these users of joint water-services and their concerns may be quite 
similar to those of farmers who receive return flows.  When sales are large enough to have 
significant impacts on return flows, they are likely to have an impact on these nonirrigation water 
uses. 
 
COMPETING STAKEHOLDERS 
 
Given the different classes of externalities listed above, there are four to seven 
stakeholder groups that are likely to be important in future expansion of water markets (table 5).  
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Table 5.  Primary Stakeholder Groups 
 
1.  Irrigators selling water 
2.  Users purchasing water 
3.  Irrigators not selling water   
4. Environmental  groups 
5.  Nonirrigation water users 
6. Local  businesses 
7. Irrigation  agency 
 
Yet as already suggested, these different stakeholder groups are likely to have conflicting 
objectives.  The first two groups include those irrigators who can profit from and want to sell 
water outside the district or basin and the users purchasing the water.  A third group involves 
those irrigators who might be damaged by increased water sales either due to reduced return 
flows or higher pumping costs.  Also we could include in this group those farmers who might 
have higher infrastructure (canal) maintenance costs if other farmers sell their water and do not 
continue to assist with canal maintenance.
1  The impact on canal maintenance is primarily the 
result of how many irrigation systems are organized with canal maintenance the responsibility of 
farmers using the canals.  Part of the problem is that canal maintenance has strong, local, public 
good characteristics.  For example, all farmers using a canal benefit from the 
maintenance efforts of farmers particularly those at the head of the canal.  
A fourth group of stakeholders would be those who are concerned about the 
environmental damage caused by reduced stream flows, dropping groundwater tables or fallowed  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 To deal with maintenance problems, some contracts for water sales require the water sellers to continue 
expenditures for canal maintenance even after they have sold their water and stopped irrigating.   7 
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Figure 1.    Direct and Indirect Water Uses 
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land.
2 Dropping groundwater tables can cause wetland and/or nearby streams to dry up or decline 
significantly.  Reduced stream flows can mean loss of species dependent on cold running water 
while fallowed land may cause dust storms.  Closely aligned with environmentalists is a fifth 
group, the nonirrigation users of the canal water (livestock water, recreation, etc.).  The sixth 
group would be the local business interests that will oppose transfer to other areas but not 
necessarily to other users, particularly if the other users are local businesses.   
In some government owned and/or managed irrigation systems there is a seventh 
stakeholder’s group, the irrigation agency, which must be considered.  The irrigation agency 
might feel threatened by water sales.  If sales are large, this could mean loss of their jobs.  The 
concern would be much greater if the change also involved privatization of a government 
irrigation system.  In this case there would be a high probability of job losses and the agency 
staff would work against such a change. 
      Of these seven groups, the latter five may have quite similar objectives and may form 
coalitions to oppose water trades (table 6).  At other times, they may not work together since 
some environmental groups oppose all water trades while other groups would be willing to allow 
trading under the right restrictions.  In fact, some of the farmers, who at first may lose due to 
expanded water trading, may want the option to become sellers in the future.  Most nonirrigation 
water users are likely to have weak or no water rights and will, generally, not benefit from trades 
outside the region.  This means their interest may be more closely aligned with environmental 
groups.  In contrast, local business interests and the irrigation agency may be willing to support 
                                                 
2 If fallow land is not managed carefully, soil erosion and weeds can be a problem for neighboring farms. 
Also if large areas are fallowed, local dust storms can result. Again water sales contracts can include provisions that 
require farmers, who are selling their water, to control their weeds and take measures to prevent wind erosion. Such 
contracts will require increased monitoring and enforcement efforts by the community. 
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some water sales outside the region as long as it does not damage the farming base they serve.
3 
In fact, local businesses might look favorably at water sales in which the profits are reinvested in 
new irrigation water-saving technology and farming practices, e.g., drip or sprinkler irrigation. 
This would be particularly true if much of the new equipment is purchased locally. 
 
Table 6.    Stakeholders Groups Likely to Form Coalitions to Support or Oppose Regional Water 
Trading 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThose with a double x are likely to take a strong position for or against regional water trading. 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Several different types of institutional arrangements have been used to prevent water 
trading while others have been developed to promote trading by providing protection against 
some of the externalities created by trades.  One of the institutions in place that restricts water 
trading in U.S. states, such as California, is the reasonable and beneficial use requirement.  If 
water rights owners do not use their water beneficially and reasonably as specified in their water 
rights, they can lose their water rights.  The courts may interpret the sale of water as not making 
reasonable and beneficial use of the water.  This can mean the loss of water rights by those who 
                                                 
3 However, some have argued that, in a number of areas, because of the inelastic demand for water in the 
urban sector, it may only be the first water sellers who benefit from higher prices. After the urban market is satisfied, 
water prices will drop and so may agricultural land prices that are based on the initial high water prices (Haddad, 
2000). 
 
 Likely  Coalitions
a 
Competing Stakeholders  Support Trades  Oppose Trades 
1.  Irrigators selling water  x   
2.  Users purchasing water  xx   
3.  Environmental groups    xx 
4.  Local businesses    x 
5.  Irrigators not selling water    x 
6.  Nonirrigation water users    xx 
7.  Irrigation agency    x   10 
 
buy or sell water rights.  The uncertainty created by such laws has been enough to help prevent 
potential sales of permanent water rights in states such as California (Archibald and Renwick, 
1998).  
A second group of institutions that have restricted water trading are laws that tie water 
rights to land ownership.  In such cases, the buyer must purchase the land to get the water rights. 
This is typical for groundwater as well as some surface waters rights.  Keeping water rights tied 
to land is based on the “old” riparian water law and the belief that water is a local resource and 
should be saved for local use, primarily for agriculture production. 
A third type of institutional restriction, that has been used more recently, is to introduce 
laws or change laws to make the water seller liable for any damages caused because of water 
sales.  Since ex ante it is difficult to determine what (or if) water sales damage any third parties 
or the environment, many potential sellers are afraid to sell water because of the potential 
liability (Archibald and Renwick, 1998). 
These types of restrictions tend to be supported by the stakeholders groups who are likely 
to work to block water market expansion.  The important question is what institutional 
arrangements might be developed to deal with the concerns of these groups so that water trading 
can be expanded? If one looks at the conditions for effective water markets, two institutional 
arrangements appear to be critical, particularly for those farmers not selling water, local 
businesses, and nonirrigation water users (Easter and Archibald, 2001).  They are: (1) 
mechanisms that provide “reasonable” protection, against damages caused by water sales, for 
those (third parties) not directly involved in water sales, and (2) mechanisms for resolving 
conflicts over water rights and changes in water use.  The first of these mechanisms is 
particularly important for environmental groups, nonirrigation water users and local businesses, 
while the second is critical for water rights holders and not as important for the other groups. 
These two arrangements can be informal and handled by water users organizations if 
water trades are local and transparent.  A formal but nonlegalistic approach might also work such 
as a state commission that would have to review and decide on any sales that were contested as   11 
 
in New Mexico, for example.  More elaborate and formal mechanisms may be necessary, such as 
Colorado's water courts, when water trading expands.  To protect those farmers receiving return 
flows and nonirrigation water uses, some surface-water irrigated areas restrict sales to only the 
consumptive use part of the water right.  One typical solution has been to restrict sales to only 
50% of the water right (table 7).  The problem with such rules is that 50% represents an average 
for existing technology.  If there are different irrigation technologies used in an area, there may 
be large differences in return flows among farmers.  Imposing the 50% rule on all farmers would 
be considered unfair by those farmers using water saving technology such as sprinklers or drip 
irrigation.  Consequently, a more flexible institutional arrangement (restriction on sales) may be 
necessary to facilitate trades among uses and regions. 
Table 7.  Primary Stakeholder Group Benefiting from New Institutional Arrangement 
 
Institutional Arrangements 
 
 
Competing Stakeholders 
Adversely Affected 
A
a 
Consumptive 
B 
Permits 
C 
Limits 
D 
Compensation 
E 
Districts 
F 
Flow 
Environmental  groups     x x x  x 
Local  businesses      x  x   
Irrigators not selling water  x  x  x  x  x   
Nonirrigation water users  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Irrigation agency      x       
aInstitutional arrangements for placating different stakeholder groups. 
A = Limit water sales to consumptive use 
B = Well permits 
C = Limits on local water sales (10%) 
D = Fund to compensate for third-party losses 
E = Ground district with volumetric water rights 
F = Limits on stream flow reductions 
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Many states in the U.S., irrigating with groundwater, require permits before a well can be 
installed.  As part of the application for a well permit, the firm or person requesting a permit may 
also have to show that their pumping will not interfere with any other wells already in the area. 
There also may be a waiting period during which time anyone can contest a permit request.  If 
done correctly, the use of permits can effectively deal with the well-interference problem but it 
will not solve the larger problem of dropping groundwater tables and higher pumping costs over 
time when pumping exceeds recharge rates.  This is, partly, because of our limited knowledge 
concerning the recharge of many of our aquifers and the difficulty of quantifying volumetric 
groundwater rights.  In a few of the areas where overpumping and declining groundwater tables 
are causing serious problems, such as salt water intrusion or land compaction, pumping districts 
have been established that actually limit pumping rates and invest in groundwater recharge.  This 
essentially involves establishing water rights in volumetric terms at the district level.  Both 
establishing districts and requiring permits are promising ways to limit the adverse effects of 
water trades on other farmers and domestic water users in a pumping area.  However, not many 
effective pumping districts have ever been established while permits cannot deal with pumping 
that already significantly exceeds recharge rates.
4 
Another difficult question is how to address local business and environmental concerns? 
Howitt and Vaux (1995) have suggested that because of the impacts of water trades on local 
business, California may want to limit water sold from each county.  This would prevent sales 
from being concentrated in just a few counties.  The State of California took the suggestion 
somewhat further and banned all water sales based on land fallowing which appeared to satisfy 
many of the local business concerns. 
                                                 
4 Currently much of California's groundwater is allocated based on correlative rights. Landowners 
overlying a common aquifer can use the water and are entitled to a reasonable share of the water during times of 
shortage. If one wants to export this groundwater, these sales are likely to be restricted to surpluses. Only under 
special conditions (no objections from other users) can one get a prescriptive right to this exported groundwater. 
Therefore, because of high transaction costs, export sales can occur only when a few users are involved (Kanazawa, 
1999). 
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The issue of potential environmental impacts is more difficult to deal with because of the 
lack of information particularly about the likely future impacts of changes in water use on the 
environment.  One suggestion made in California was to establish a fund from taxes on 
interbasin water sales to compensate for third-party losses (Howitt, 1998).  Such a fund would be 
used to mitigate environmental damages and compensate stakeholders damaged by water trading. 
The next step is to determine if these or other institutional arrangements, when effectively 
administered, would allow water markets to expand and develop in countries facing increased 
water scarcity.  What has been the experience within areas identified as having water market 
activity? Equally important is the need to better understand the likely impact different proposed 
water institutions might have on the different stakeholder groups.  
 
COUNTRY EXPERIENCE 
Some of the countries and states that have been cited as examples of active water markets 
include California and Colorado in the United States, Chile, and India.  As mentioned earlier, 
only the California Water Bank has moved large quantities of water over long distances and 
among different uses (Easter and Archibald, 2001).  In Chile water markets have been restricted 
to select areas in the north and within small river basins (Bauer, 1998).  Here trading has been 
mostly among irrigators with only limited trades between irrigators and the urban sector and 
these have not involved fallowing significant amounts of land.  For India trades have been 
primarily with groundwater and mostly among farmers in the same village.  The main concerns 
in India have been declining watertables, in some areas, and in others, monopoly pricing.  
Northern Colorado has an active market but most of the trading is in the same water district or 
basin. 
Only in the case of water sales from the Colorado/Big Thompson project do you see an 
active water market between different types of users and across districts in Colorado.  Other than 
this source of water, most water is being traded within water companies or districts.  In fact, it 
has been difficult for cities to buy water from these districts or companies.  For example, Thorton   14 
 
(near Denver) tried to transfer water rights, that it had “secretly” purchased from a water supply 
and storage company, but faced strong resistance and litigation.  “This litigation lasted for many 
years and resulted in the city eventually receiving the right to transfer about 50 percent of the 
historic water supply that it had purchased” (Simpson and Ringskog, 1997, p. 23).  The city was 
also required to prevent wind erosion and noxious weed growth if it transfers the water. 
The reason why the Colorado/Big Thompson project water is traded quite freely has to do 
with the water rights.  These rights do not allow for any compensation for injuries to third-party 
water users.  In other words, return-flow users cannot obtain any water rights for the return 
flows.  Chile's water law also does not appear to allow for return-flow water rights.  Owners of 
water-use rights in Chile can sell all their water right and not just the consumptive part.  
However, “water rights owners affected by someone else's change or transfer of use can protest 
either to the canal association involved or to the civil courts” (Bauer, 1998, p. 63).  The potential 
for a protest creates enough uncertainty so that most Chilean irrigators have not wanted to test 
the law by selling outside their association.  Thus in Chile, water markets have not developed 
across river basins because of the high transaction costs due to infrastructure constraints, 
multiple water uses, and uncertainty regarding water rights as well as other institutional 
limitations (Bauer, 1998).  So far Chile has not established effective mechanisms to resolve 
problems associated with competing multiple water uses and third party damages caused by 
water trading, particularly those involving environmental damages and nonconsumptive uses.  
For example, nonconsumptive (hydropower) uses have proven to be more competitive with 
consumptive uses than originally expected because timing of nonconsumptive use  (hydropower) 
and their location on the river have made them competitive with irrigation (figure 1).  When the 
water law was written, little or no competition was expected between consumptive and 
nonconsumptive uses. 
Concerns about external impacts appear to have limited interregional trades in California.  
Haddad (2000) finds that “great public energy over the past two decades has gone into creating 
water markets, but few results have been realized in terms of long-term interregional rural-to-  15 
 
urban transfers” (p. 134).  He goes on to say that “market-based rural-to-urban reallocation of 
water is likely to be a slow, limited process for many years to come” (p. 149).  Yet his 
conclusion would likely change with institutional innovation. 
Kanazawa (1999) thinks that California may be ready for some significant changes in 
water rights, which will make water trading outside water districts much easier.  He argues that 
changes in water law go through three stages and that California is entering the third stage.  In 
the first stage when water is in surplus, there are few restrictions on water trading.  However, in 
stage two when shortages are experienced, water trading outside the district or basin is restricted.  
Finally, in stage three when shortages really hurt urban areas, the restrictions on trading are 
modified and markets can move water across regions and uses. 
Kanazawa’s three stages are not too different from the three stages discussed by Saleth 
and Dinar (2002):  1) mind changes, 2) political articulation, and 3) operationalization.   Clearly, 
developing and establishing new institutional arrangements is a key part of the operationalization 
of water markets and would occur in Kanazawa’s third stage. 
 
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
The above country experience suggests that changes in institutional arrangements are not 
only possible but necessary if water markets are to be an important tool for transferring water 
among different types of users and regions.  Two of the more difficult problems involve concerns 
about the impacts of water trading (1) on local businesses and (2) on the environmental quality.  
Of these two concerns the one that appears to be growing worldwide is the concern about 
environmental impacts, although local business and employment impacts may be just as big a 
concern in many countries.  Can we develop institutional arrangements that allow water to be 
traded across regions and uses while still protecting key environmental services and not overly 
harm local business? How can local interests and other concerned citizens be given assurance 
that water trading will not deprive them of environmental services or that local businesses and 
workers will be left high and dry?   16 
 
For a new institutional arrangement to be effective it would need to meet four criteria.  
First, it should allow some expanded water trading among different uses and/or between regions.  
Second, net social benefits from the expanded water trading should be positive.  Third, the major 
stakeholder groups should feel that the new institutional arrangement is “fair.” Finally, the same 
stakeholder groups should have assurances that local water managers and/or government 
officials will effectively implement the new institutional arrangement. 
The first two criteria are very straightforward.  If they cannot be achieved, then there is 
no reason for the new institutional arrangement.  The third and fourth criteria are about whether 
or not the new arrangement will be effective.  With a strong central government some of the 
stakeholder groups may be ignored but in most democracies this is difficult and usually 
counterproductive.  Thus the stakeholder groups need to feel that the trades will be “fair.” In this 
case “fairness” would be based on the idea that the expanded trading involves no envy by any 
group of stakeholders (Baumol, 1982).  In an irrigation system this would mean that the farmers 
irrigating with return flows would not envy those who had used the water up stream.  “Fairness” 
is similar to Rawls' principles of compatible liberty and justice, which preclude “an individual or 
group from enjoying undue influence over water receipts, system maintenance or system 
enforcement” (Bromley et al., 1980, p. 377). 
The need for assurance regarding implementation and enforcement of the institutional 
arrangement is just as important as fairness.  If one stakeholder group thinks that another group 
will take advantage of their political and/or economic power and distort implementation of the 
new arrangement, then they will work to block its enactment.  A water system with a good 
record of effectively reallocating water during drought periods combined with a government 
regulatory agency that has been effective in protecting third party interest (local business and 
environmental interests) would provide such assurance. 
To determine if a new institutional arrangement meets the above criteria, we first need to 
think of the optimum use of irrigation water that can be achieved through trading given 
alternative third party (environmental or business) safeguards.  One possible safeguard might be   17 
 
to allow water trading as long as in-stream water flows are not drawn below a certain level.  
Once water flows drop below this level, water transfers would be reduced until the level of water 
flows is restored.  The cutback of transfers could be based on the time of the water sales much 
like “seniority” in appropriative water rights.  The last transfer or sale would be cut back first.  
Another option would be to have proportionate cuts in all out-of-region sales.   A safeguard like 
the above would also address many of the concerns of nonirrigation water users and appears to 
meet their “fairness” criteria.  Withdrawal limits based on stream flow levels and other possible 
safeguards still need to be evaluated to determine how much is given up in the purchasing region 
from loss in water sales due to the safeguards, compared to the gains in the environmental 
services and/or returns to local businesses.  (Net social benefits are positive.) For example, in 
evaluating the flow limit, it might involve the comparison between the income foregone in the 
purchasing region and the gain from fish catch and/or local service industry profits in the region 
limiting sales. 
For local business and many of the farmers using return flows, absolute limits on water 
transfers may be the critical issue and pass their “fairness” test.  Both of these groups are more 
concerned about the current irrigators continuing to farm at about the same level.  They are less 
concerned about in-stream flows and more concerned that irrigation does not drop by more than 
5 or 10%.  A good example of this was found in the 2001 Klamath River conflict between 
irrigators and environmentalists.  Farmers had their water turned off by the federal government 
to maintain stream flow and protect two endangered fish species as required by the U.S. 
Endangered Species Act.  In this case almost all the local people were against cutting off 
irrigation water to protect the fish and supported the farmers’ efforts to legally and illegally open 
up canal headgates.  It illustrates how environmental stakeholders are not likely to obtain much 
support from local businesses and farm groups unless they are protecting environmental services 
that local people also value highly and the action will not seriously damage the local economy. 
In a few cases these types of water allocation trade-offs can be found within the same 
groups of stakeholders.  For example, in some projects the irrigators may also do the fishing.    18 
 
Such a case was found in the Kirindi Oya project in Sri Lanka where the fisher persons also own 
agricultural land (Meinzen-Dick and Bakker, 2000).  In other projects there may be farmers 
using both hydropower and irrigation water.  Furthermore, there will be systems where some of 
the irrigators also own local businesses. 
For these types of stakeholder groups the decisions concerning the value of water in 
different uses involves a trade-off within their own optimization framework.  Their question is 
whether they want more hydropower and less irrigation water, or more irrigation water and less 
hydropower.  In the case of the Kirindi Oya project during drought periods, farmer/fisher persons 
appeared to favor irrigation over fishing in the water allocation decisions (Meinzen-Dick and 
Bakker, 2000).  For a more affluent population the decision might be different.  The interesting 
point is that in such trade-offs one does not get the fishing or environmental benefits for nothing.  
The farmer/fisher persons must give up crop output to obtain more fishing.  The benefits and 
costs do not fall on different stakeholders.  Unfortunately this is usually not the case when you 
are selling water between regions.  Someone is benefiting from the water purchase in one region 
while others may lose as well as benefit (seller) in the region from which the water is sold. 
Thus there is a clear need for institutional safeguards to assure potential losers that the 
negative impact on them will be small or that they will be compensated for their losses.  
Unfortunately, there are currently few institutional arrangements that provided means for the 
traders to compensate potential losers or assure third parties that they will not be big losers. 
If Kanazawa (1999) is right, regions facing increasing water scarcity, such as the western 
U.S. and North Africa, may be moving into stage three where the trading of water rights is less 
restricted.  If this is the case, what safeguards should be recommended so the damage to third 
parties is limited and trading will be facilitated? One basic safeguard follows from the Owens 
Valley purchase that southern California made which could have dried up the valley as well as 
the Thorton Colorado purchase discussed earlier.  This rule would read something like: make the 
transaction transparent and, at least, partially compensate third parties that are damaged by the 
water sales.  Such a rule would, most likely, put a constraint on how much water was taken out   19 
 
of an area.  If too many people might be damaged by the sales, then the transaction costs of the 
trade would be too high since the cost borne by third parties gets translated into higher 
transaction costs.  To hold down transaction costs there would also need to be some political 
mechanism to facilitate the process of determining who needs to be compensated and by how 
much.  Such mechanisms would complement the compensation rule and, ideally, keep water 
trading out of the courts.   
Other safeguards for the environment may be needed to facilitate regional water trading 
particularly in developed countries.  As suggested earlier, this might mean simple stream flow 
requirements in any water right that was traded to users outside the region.  Where reservoirs 
water supplies are available, the safeguard could involve rules for water releases that favor the 
environment as opposed to irrigation or hydropower production. 
 
CONCLUSION 
It will take innovations in institutional arrangements to help move water markets to the 
next level.  At this level water markets will become a more effective tool for moving water 
between regions and/or among different types of use (irrigation to urban use).  The California 
Water Bank is only one model, and not necessarily the best model since no market clearing 
mechanisms were allowed to work, and the bank was designed only for temporary water 
transfers. 
The next step in this work will be to develop a more formal model to help ascertain the 
likely impact and effectiveness of different institutional arrangements.  For instance, would the 
trading of water rights conditional on water flow levels in a river be an effective arrangement? 
Clearly, institutional arrangements need to be developed that consider water users, both 
consumptive and nonconsumptive, and other stakeholders who may face changes in their water 
supply or business activity because of water trades.  Thus, another part of our future research 
agenda is to develop alternative institutional arrangements that will reduce the uncertainty that 
different stakeholders may perceive with water trading.  If stakeholders can be given assurance   20 
 
of compensation for losses caused by water trading, or shown that no losses will occur, then they 
are not as likely oppose water trading just because they “think” they may be damaged. 
  The latter appears to have happened in Westlands Water District in central California.  
Irrigators first tended to oppose interdistrict water transfers but as their local market expanded 
and they better understood the potential benefits from water trading, their resistance turned to 
support (Easter and Archibald, 2001).  Hopeful future analysis will help provide a much clearer 
picture of what real gains and losses can be expected from expanded water trading under 
alternative institutional arrangements and thus facilitate future trading. 
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